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THE ROLE OF STATE ARBITRAZH UNDER THE NEW
CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
IN THE SOVIET UNION *
LEGAL SOURCES OF THE PLANNED ECONOMY
A department store in Moscow receives defective merchandise from
a supplier; a factory fails to deliver an order as scheduled; a shipment
of goods to a warehouse in Tashkent is incomplete; or one enterprise
deliberately refuses to enter into an agreement with another. These
are typical of the disputes that arise between state enterprises and
organizations in the Soviet Union. The rapid and just resolution of
these conflicts is apparently considered essential to the efficient im
plementation of the centrally-directed economic plan.
The agency of State Arbitration (Arbitrazh or Gosarbitrazk')
exists to resolve such disputes between socialist enterprises. The
operation and competence of Arbitrazh is best understood by an exam-
ination of the Statute on State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers.' This statute regulates the Arbitration Department of the
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the U.S.S.R. of the University of Glasgow, Visiting Professor of Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania 1967-1968, each of whom read and commented on the
manuscript at some stage of its preparation. This paper is considerably improved as
a result of their criticism.
1 The Russian word arbitrazh (Gosudarstvenny or Gos-Arbitrazh-State Arbi-
trazh; Vedomstvenny Arbitrash-Departmental Arbitrazh; Vneshnetorgovoy Arbi-
trazh-Foreign Trade Arbitrazh) does not carry the same connotation as does the
English word "arbitration." Soviet State Arbitrazh is a system of specialized eco-
nomic courts, not conciliation agencies established to bring about compromises be-
tween the parties before them. Arbitration tribunals in the Western sense have been
established in the Soviet Union and are known as treteiskiye sudy or courts of concilia-
tion. See text accompanying notes 104-10 infra. In this Comment, State Arbitrazh or
Gosarbitrash will be used to refer to the structure and procedure of the economic
courts. A state arbitration tribunal, which tribunals exist at the local, regional,
republican and union level, will be referred to as an arbitrazh.
2 Statute on State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, [1961] Zak.
Akty 745 (Legislative Acts 1960), 2 Soy. STAT. & Dac. No. 1, at 5 (196S) ; 3. HAZ-
ARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE Sovlm LEGAI. SYSTEM (pt 2, at 113-16 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as HAZARD & SHAPIRO]; 12 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIEr PRESS, No. 42, at 15
(1960). This statute replaced the law in effect since 1931.
There are also rules for arbitrazhy, see, e.g., Rules of Consideration of Economic
Disputes by State Arbitrazhy, [1964] Instr. Ukaz. 24 (Directive Instructions of State
Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1963), 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at
26 (1965). The rules are based upon the maximum democratization of the arbitration
process and, therefore, encourage voluntary and direct settlement of disputes. Various
rules have received considerable discussion in Soviet legal periodicals. See Barash,
Commentary on the Rules for the Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbi-
tration Agencies, [1963] 20 SOVETSKAYA IUSTITSIYA [SOy. IUST.] 18, translated in
2 Soy. L. & Gov'r No. 4, at 55 (1964) ; Falkovich, Commentary on the Rules for the
Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitration Agencies, [1963] 18 Soy.
(1285)
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Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the ultimate arbitral tribunal in
the Soviet Union. State Arbitrazh has competence, subject to a juris-
dictional amount,' to hear disputes between (1) enterprises in different
republics, or (2) enterprises which are subordinated to different depart-
ments or ministries.4 The union republics and autonomous regions
have arbitration structures similar to that of the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers.'
Arbitrazh operates at either of two stages: during contract
negotiations or following a breach of contract by a state enterprise.6 In
the pre-contract cases, Arbitrazh forces a reluctant enterprise to enter
into a contract with a willing partner, or settles disputes over draft
contracts.' After a contract is breached, Arbitrazh applies property
sanctions' and, in certain circumstances, refers the matter to the
Procurator General for possible criminal sanctions against individual
managers of enterprises.
lusT. 16, translated in 2 Sov. L. & GoV'T No. 4, at 55 (1964) ; Petrov, Commentary
on the Rules for the Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitration,
[1964] 5 Soy. IusT. 17, translated in 3 Soy. L. & Gov'T No. 2, at 38 (1964), 5 Soy.
REv. No. 4, at 40 (1964) ; Shapkina, Commentary on the Rules for the Consideration
of Economic Disputes by State Arbitration, [1964] 4 Soy. lusT. 14, translated in 3 Soy.
L. & Gov'T No. 2, at 38 (1964), 5 Soy. REv. No. 4, at 40 (1964).
8 The amount in dispute must be greater than 1,000,000 (post-1961) rubles, about
$1,100,000, in pre-contract cases, and 10,000 (post-1961) rubles, about $11,000, in
completed contract cases. Statute on State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers §§ 3(a), 3(c), [1961] Zak. Akty 745 (Legislative Acts 1960), 2 Soy. STAT.
& DEC. No. 1, at 5 (1965), HAZARD & SHAPIRO 113-16, 12 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
SOVIET PRESS No. 42, at 15 (1960). These amounts limit jurisdiction of the State
Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Local, regional and republican
arbitrashy have varying maximum and minimum jurisdictional amounts. Cf. note 103
infra and accompanying text. Disputes involving less than the jurisdictional amount
are settled administratively within the Ministries or Departments involved. Johnson,
Planning and Contract Law, 12 Soy. STUDIES 263 & n.6 (1961).
4 Departmental or Agency Arbitrazh has jurisdiction over disputes between enter-
prises in a single Ministry or Department of the U.S.S.R. State Arbitrazh must not
accept such cases for consideration, and a mistakenly accepted dispute is not subject
to a decision on the merits by Arbitrash. Kokandsky Shoe Factory v. Dzhambul-
kozhobuv Combine (State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1966),
in [1967] 7 Soy. IUST. 32.
5 The U.S.S.R. is a federation of 15 republics, the largest of which is the Russian
Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). The codes and statutes vary little from republic to republic.
For other Arbitrazh statutes, see, e.g., Statute on State Arbitration of the R.S.F.S.R.
Council of Ministers (1960), [1961] 2 Soy. IUST. 25, translated in part in HAZARD &
SHAPIRO 116. Republican arbitration tribunals are concerned with disputes between
enterprises in the same republic.
6 Arbitrazh is one form of "legal control," over the administration of the economic
bureaucracy. The others are the ordinary courts and the Procuracy. The Procurator
General has supervisory power over the execution of the laws. See M. FAINsoD, How
RussIA is RuLED 411-14 (2d ed. 1963).
7 Loeber, Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law, 1964 U. ILL. L. F. 128;
146, reprinted in LAw IN THE SovIET SOCIETY 128 (W. LaFave ed. 1965).
8 For example, fines can be exacted from defaulting enterprises and specific per-
formance of the terms of delivery contracts may be awarded. Arbitrazh also grants
damages for tort claims of one enterprise against another.
9 Procedure for Forwarding to Agencies of the Procuracy Notices of Instances
of Delivery of Poor Quality and Incomplete Products, [1964] Instr. Ukaz. 248 (Direc-
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In both these situations, the conflict and interaction between the
economic plan and the law of contracts is vivid.'" Lenin's critical
adaptations of Marxism to the immature Tsarist Russian economy,1
as implemented by Stalin's forced collectivization and rapid industriali-
zation of Soviet Russia, are the origins of the centrally-planned econ-
omy. The prime objective and initial emphasis of the political leaders
was rapid growth of producers' goods. In accordance with the direc-
tives of those leaders, the production of goods for current consumption
was sacrificed to the development of heavy industry. The legal em-
bodiment of the command economy 12 is article 11 of the Constitution
of the U.S.S.R., which provides:
The economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and directed
by the state national economic plan, with the aim of increasing
the public wealth, of steadily raising the material and cultural
standards of the working people, of consolidating the inde-
pendence of the U.S.S.R. and [of] strengthening its defensive
capacity.' 3
five Instructions of State Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1949),
2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 79 (1965). The basis of the power of Arbitrazh to make
such referrals is that incomplete and substandard deliveries cause loss to the state.
See R.S.F.S.R. 1961 UaoL. KOD. (Criminal Code) art. 170, which makes criminal
"malicious use of power or of a responsible position... if causing substantial harm
to state or public interests. .. ."
A British lawyer has reported that the main criticism of Arbitrazh by Soviet com-
mentators is that the arbitrators do not make full use of their power to report infringe-
ments to the Procuracy. Johnson, Commercial Arbitration in the U.S.S.R. since the
Decentralization of Industrial Management, 11 Soy. STUDsS 134, 135 (1959). This
has been subsequently corroborated. E.g., Liberman, Arbitration Practice in Cases
Involving the Quality and Completeness of Production, [1963] 12 SovETsKoYE Gosu-
DARSTvO I PRavo [Soy. Gos. I PRAv.] 132, 3 Soy. L. & Gov'r No. 2, at 47, 54 (1964).
10 In light of the significance of contracts in the Soviet Union, it is revealing to
note that the first of the "primary tasks" enumerated in the Statute on State Arbitra-
tion is "to assure the protection of the property rights and legal interests of enterprises
and organizations in the decision of economic disputes." The second "primary task"
makes reference to "[c]ollaboration . . . for fulfillment of the national economic plan
.... "--indicating that the protection of "property rights," including contract rights, is
at least as important as fulfillment of the plan. Statute on State Arbitration of the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers §§2(a)-(b), [1961] Zak. Akty 745 (Legislative Acts
1960), 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 5 (1965), HAZARD & SAPIRO 113-16, 12 CUanRREr
DIGEST OF THE Sovrxr PREss No. 42, at 15 (1960).
11 Marx never formulated any rules for operating an economy; centralized eco-
nomic planning is certainly not an essential part of Marxism. See generally Berliner,
MarxTism and the Soviet Economy, in THE SovIET EcoN moY 18-33 (M. Bornstein &
D. Fusfeld eds. 1966).
12The term "command economy" applies to the implementation of the plan rather
than to plan construction. Levine, Economics, in ScIENcE AND IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET
SOCIErY 107, 112 (G. Fischer ed. 1967).
13 Two Soviet legal commentators in their annotation to this provision have noted
that central planning ensures: (1) coordination of all branches of the economy;
(2) technical progress; (3) rational distribution of the productive forces; and (4)
improvement in the well-being of the working people. A. DENIsov & M. KiRIcHsKo,
SovIET STATE LAw 126-27 (1960). See also RS.F.S.R. 1964 GRAzH. KoD. (Civil
Code) art. 1 (para. 2): "The economic life of the RSFSR is regulated and directed
by the state national economic plan."
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Article 9 reaffirms that the socialist economy predominates; 14 in such
a society, it is clear that planning acts have the force of law.-'
Since the inauguration of "the plan as law," '0 the fundamental
problem has been the determination of'which details of the relations
between state enterprises should be controlled at the central planning
headquarters." Although Russian commercial law is essentially the
civil law of obligations,' 8 the official thinking about the role which con-
tracts play in the planned economy has varied from one of fully-planned
relations precluding contracts " to the obligatory drafting of complex
documents by the contracting partners.
20
However, this system, which presupposed the planned economy as
law, is finding that the traditional forms of planning are becoming
obsolete.2' Managers of certain Soviet enterprises no longer receive
incredibly detailed instructions from the central planning headquarters;
instead, they are free to solve many problems for themselves, hopefully
gearing their operations to the ability to sell their products. The key
indicator of success is the volume of sales of the enterprise,2  rather than
the fulfillment of production targets. It is now recognized that not
every detail of production can be planned-not every nut and bolt in
the Soviet Union can be accounted for by the planners in Moscow.3
Consequently, contractual relationships between enterprises are en-
couraged; in fact, sometimes ordered.24
14 Alongside the socialist system of economy, which is the predominant form
of economy in the U.S.S.R., the law permits the small private economy of
individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on their own labour and pre-
cluding the exploitation of the labour of others.
U.S.S.R. CoNsT. art. 9.
15 A. DENIsov & M. KIRICHENKO, supra note 13, at 127.
16 The first "Five-Year Plan" was begun in 1928, although the first federal con-
stitution of the U.S.S.R. authorized the union government to create a central economic
plan in 1923. J. HAZARD, THE Sovixr SYsTEM OF GOVERNMENT 86 (3d ed. rev. 1967).
17 Gosplan is the Russian acronym for the State Planning Committee. On the
organization framework of the operation of the Soviet economy, see A. NoVE, THE
Sovir ECONOMY 75-78 (rev. ed. 1965).
18 Although the law of the Soviet Union does differ in many respects from the
civil law, there are, in contrast to the common law, striking similarities between civil
and Soviet law.
19 This was the original thought in 1928.
20 See HAZARD & SHAPIRO 96-100.
21 R. CAMPBELL, SovIET ECONOMIC POWER: ITS ORGANIZATION, GROWTH AND
CHALLENGE 104 (1966).
22 For a fuller discussion of the economic reform, see text accompanying notes
79-148 infra.
23 Until recently, other socialist states of Eastern Europe have also had rigidly
controlled, centrally planned economies. Their method of economic organization also
involves civil law contracts, a form of "market socialism." See Wagner, The Law of
Contracts in Communist Countries (Russia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary),
7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292 (1963) ; Mihaly, The Role of Civil Law Institutions in the
Management of Communist Economies: The Hungarian Experience, 8 Am. J. ComP. L.
310 (1959).
24 H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R 123 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
BERMAN]. A concise discussion of the law of contract in the Soviet Union concludes
that, even though contracts may be entered into on a large scale, legal remedies are
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Since contracts now play an increasingly important role in the
planned economy, this Comment will discuss published reports of de-
cisions of State Arbitrazh 25 in order to elucidate the types of breaches
that provoke complaints, the defenses that are available and the manner
in which disputes are presently resolved. This discussion will be
followed by a dialogue, indicating the reconciliation of the conflicting
concepts of increased independent decision-making for enterprise di-
rectors and the role of Gosarbitragh as the monitor of inter-enterprise
relationships under the recent reform of economic management.
THE OBLIGATION TO PERFORM
Two relationships are involved in the contracting procedure,
the first between the superior planning agency and its operating enter-
prise (supplier or purchaser) and the second between that enterprise
and another enterprise. The planning agency sends a fond-notification
(a fond is the right to receive materials and credit over a given period
of time) to its subordinate enterprise, indicating the materials and
funds allocated to the enterprise for the planning year. After the
enterprise specifies its needs within the allocated fond, the superior
issues a naryad, or order to deliver particular types or amounts of
goods to other enterprises.26 Between the planning agency and Enter-
prise No. 1 (the supplier, for example), the obligation is to perform
the planned task-to manufacture X tons of steel or Y refrigerators.
As far as this relationship is concerned, it is clear that the obligation
stems from the planning act as expressed in an order, the naryad; the
planning organ and the recipient of the plan are not contract partners.
2 7
The normal procedure for entering into an economic contract is
for the supplier, after receiving a naryad from its superior agency, to
draft a contract and send it to the purchaser.28 If the purchaser disputes
a term in the contract or refuses to conclude a contract altogether, it
prepares a "Protocol of Disagreement" and sends it to the supplier-
not pursued zealously. See Zile, Law and the Distribution of Consumer Goods in the
Soviet Union, 1964 U. ILL. L. F. 212, 234-40, reprinted in LAW IN THE SOVIET SOCIErY
212-76 (W. LaFave ed. 1965). This has been corroborated by [1965] 5 RADYANSKOYE
PRAVO 14, translated in part in 17 Soy. STUDIES No. 9, at 13 (Information Supp.
Jan. 1966).
25 Arbitrazh decisions are selectively reported in the official Gazette of the State
Arbitrazti of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, Sbornik instruktivnykh ukazanii
gosudarstvennovo arbitrizha pri Sovete ministrov S.S.S.R. (Collection of Directive
Instructions of State Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers) [hereinafter
cited as Sbornik (Collection)], as well as being summarized in the legal periodicals.
26The naryad may specify the other enterprise or leave the choice to the sub-
ordinate.
27 Even so, it now may be possible for an enterprise to object to a planning order.
See text accompanying notes 115-21 infra.
28 The purchaser's superior also may issue a naryad, which "gives the purchaser
organization the right to place an order (zakaz) for the goods. On the basis of the
naryad, and of the zakaz, if sent, the parties enter into contracts of delivery ... "
2 Sov. STAT. & DEC. No. 2, at 1-2 (1965).
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enterprise. If the supplier agrees to the changes, a contract is con-
cluded, incorporating the protocol. If the supplier does not agree, he
has recourse to Arbitrazh to settle the disputed term or to compel the
purchaser to conclude the contract. 9
The relationship between Enterprise No. 1 (the supplier) and
Enterprise No. 2 (the purchaser) is based solely on the contract be-
tween them; the planning act neither gives any rights to, nor imposes
any obligations on, Enterprise No. 1 vis-a-vis Enterprise No. 2. The
right of the seller to demand payment from the buyer and the right of
the buyer to demand delivery from the seller both emanate from the
contract. Thus, the obligation upon an enterprise to perform its
planned task is created by the planning act, whereas the obligation
to perform for another economic entity is created by the contract be-
tween the entities.
Pre-Contract Disputes
In the pre-contract cases, Arbitrazh settles disputes over draft con-
tracts or forces a reluctant enterprise to enter into a contract with a
willing partner. A frequently disputed term in draft contracts is the
time of delivery of goods. Typical is a case in which the Delivery
Section of the Tadzhik Economic Council was required by its plan
to conclude a contract with the State Plant of the Leningrad Economic
Council for delivery of cottonseed oil." The seller proposed shipments
of equal amounts once a month, but the buyer requested shipments once
every ten days because it could not store larger shipments. State
Arbitrazh of the Turkmen S.S.R. Council of Ministers decided in favor
of the seller because the railroad provided him with tank cars only once a
month.81 On appeal to Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R. Council of Minsters,
this decision was reversed, the Chief Arbiter requiring a provision for
equal shipments twice a month.
What is crucial to the appellate decision is the fact that the Chief
Arbiter had the power to order administrative agencies to arrange their
affairs to effectuate the decision. In this case, he called upon the
Director of the Tashkent Railroad to provide the seller with tank cars
twice a month. By doing something neither of the parties could, the
arbiter was doing more than merely effecting a compromise between
the contracting parties. There were two ways of resolving the con-
29 On the planning and contract procedure, see Loeber, supra note 7, at 134-48;
BERMAN 122-24.
80 Delivery Section of the Tadzhik Economic Council v. State Plant of the Lenin-
grad Economic Council, [1960] Sbornik 33 (Collection), BERMAN 132-33.
31 Apparently, there are tremendous difficulties connected with the provision of
railroad cars. It was considered worthy of report that, in 1966, the Moscow Plant
Likhachev failed to receive more than 1300 railroad cars. Pogosov, Certain Results
and Problems of Industrial Economic Reform, [1967] 7 VESTNIK STATISTIKI 19,
translated in JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY, GENERAL INFORMATION 11, 16 (PUB. No. 42,605, 1967).
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flict: enlarging the storage facilities of the purchaser, or providing
more frequent railroad service. In this case, "neither party really
suffered a defeat;" 32 the Tashkent Railroad was the only entity that
could have suffered, since it may have been forced to reallocate cars
from another customer in order to comply with the Chief Arbiter's
decision.
33
Another pre-contract dispute involved a clause in the contract of
a bottler of wine and soft drinks which required the purchaser to
return as empties no more than 100 per cent of bottles sold to it.8 The
purchaser complained that it had no control over the number of bottles
returned by the public. State Arbitrazh decided that the contract could
contain no limit on the number of bottles returned, but warned the
bottler that it should not allow large numbers of returned bottles to
accumulate, and that it must ask its superior planning organ how to
dispose of surplus bottles. Again, one sees the arbiter going beyond
the two disputing parties and tailoring a result which is mutually
agreeable, but involving an imposition upon a third party.
State Arbitration may also force an unwilling enterprise to enter
into a contract. The Moscow Wholesale Depot "Roskhoztorga" re-
quested State Arbitrazh of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers to
require a chemical factory to negotiate a contract for the delivery of
plastic products in 1966.11 The chemical factory hesitated because of
the lack of raw materials set aside for its own plan of production. The
buyer relied on its plan of production and the fact that the goods were
in tremendous demand and were sold in advance by trading
organizations.
Arbitrazh compelled the factory to enter into a contract with the
depot, referring to the fact that the absence of materials could be
82 BE 133.
83 The other customer would apparently be able to recover its losses from the
railroad. See notes 39-43 infra and accompanying text.
Another compromise decision was obvious in a dispute over the time for delivery
of machines to a shipyard. The machine building plant was required to supply one
machine in each of the second, third and fourth quarters of 1958. The supplier re-
quested a change to no delivery in the second quarter, one machine in the third quarter
and two machines in the fourth quarter. The shipyard agreed by telegram, but rejected
the change upon signing the contract. State Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers decided, on appeal, that the decision of the lower arbitrazh, upholding the
original arrangement, was unrealistic since its decision was handed down on June 20,
ten days before the end of the second quarter. The machine plant was allowed to
deliver one unit in August and the remaining units according to the revised schedule.
Machine Building Plant v. Shipbuilding Plant, [1959] Sbornik 37 (Collection 1958),
2 Sov. STAT. & Dac. No. 3, at 20 (1966).
3 4 Pre-Contract Request of Leningrad Provincial Arbitration for Advice (State
Arbitration of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers 1960), in [1961] 7 SOTSIALISTI-
CHESKAYA ZAKONNOST [SoTs. ZAK.] 92, 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 3, at 23 (1966),
HAZARD & SHAPIRO 125-26.
:35Moscow Wholesale Depot "Roskhoztorga" v. Moscow Chemical Factory
"Khimfoto" (State Arbitration of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers 1966), in
[1966] 20 Soy. IusT. 33.
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investigated upon the consideration of disputes about the exaction of
sanctions for nondelivery of finished products, rather than upon the
entering into of contracts.8" State Arbitrash also requested the
superior organizations of the chemical factory to guarantee the raw
materials prescribed by plans of production.
These decisions bear out Professor Dietrich Loeber's theory that
[d] isputes before Arbitrazh are not necessarily legal in char-
acter; they may also involve questions of economic ex-
pediency . . . . Arbitrazh decisions have often an operative
rather than a judicial character: they are part of the day-to-
day economic administration.8
7
The "operative character" of pre-contract decisions means that they
operate not only on the contracting parties to conclude contracts or
to resolve a contract term, but also on others to effectuate the resulting
contract. The decision to impose upon other enterprises and agencies
the obligation to aid in the fulfillment of delivery plans 8 is "not neces-
sarily legal in character," but is based on economic expediency as well.
Non-Conforming Deliveries
Absence of Raw Materials
In many situations, delay or nondelivery by prime suppliers is
connected with the tardy or nonreceipt of raw materials or units of
semi-finished goods from superiors or from cooperating enterprises
designated by them.
Ordinarily, the factual impossibility of performing a task is no
defense to an action for breach of contract brought by a purchaser. In
Moscow Woolen Base v. Troitsky Cloth Factory,39 the purchaser sued
for damages resulting from nondelivery of woolen cloth. The supplier
defended on the ground that its superior did not allocate sufficient raw
materials to enable it to fulfill the contract with the purchaser; in other
words, the fault lay with the supplier's superior, not with the supplier.
The R.S.F.S.R. State Arbitrazh rejected this argument and decided
that the supplier was liable. The tribunal explained that the mere
absence of raw materials does not serve to relieve the supplier from
liability unless the supplier shows that it has done all it can to secure
3 This principle might not be followed today. See text accompanying notes 115-24
infra.
3 7 Loeber, suprca note 7, at 146.
38 This is one of the "primary tasks" of State Arbitration. Statute on State
Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers § 2(d), [1961] Zak. Akty 745 (Legis-
lative Acts 1960), 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 5 (1965), HAZARD & SHAimo 113-16,
12 CURRNT DIGEST OF THE SovIr PRESS No. 42, at 15 (1960).
39 (State Arbitration of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers 1965), in [1966]
11 Soy. TUST. 31.
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materials from the superior.4" Professor Loeber describes such a
result as "harsh," but necessary-"to decide otherwise would allow
producers to use shortcomings of planning authorities as [an] . .
excuse for their own failures . . . and to rely . . . on the mechanisms
of planning." 41
On its face, the Moscow Woolen decision appears to ignore the
requirement of the Russian Civil Code that there be no contractual
liability without fault.4  This apparent contradiction has been ex-
plained by Professor Harold Berman:
Despite the general requirement that there is no liability
for breach of contract without fault, the failure of the sup-
plier's own sources of supply is not considered to be a valid
excuse for his nonperformance; in such cases a fictitious
fault is assumed to exist.4
The theory is that the seller and its superior are a single entity,
thus depriving the seller of the defense that its superior, and not itself,
was at fault. In this sense, however, all agencies and enterprises in the
Soviet Union are ultimately one; all are subordinate to the highest
economic organ, the Council of Ministers. But the individual enter-
prises at the lower levels do enter into contracts with each other; they
are capable of suing and being sued; and money sanctions are applied
against them. In short, the fault is "fictitiously" attributed to the
operating enterprises, which have an independent existence in their
contractual relations and are separate from their superiors.
A purchaser was held responsible for the faults of its superior in
Suit of Tikhvinsky Aluminum Factory." In that case the factory
was required to supply the purchaser with 170 tons of polishing com-
40 In a suit by a producer of insulating materials for damages for incomplete de-
livery, the defense again was that the supplier had not been provided with raw ma-
terials by its superior; in spite of this, defendant delivered all it could. The lower
arbilrazh found that plaintiff did not attempt to use other raw materials in the manu-
facture of insulating materials. On appeal, a decision for defendant was affirmed by
the Deputy Chief Arbiter of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Kharkov Factory
"Elektrotiazmash" v. Bobrovsk Insulation Factory (State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R.
Council of Ministers), in [1960] 12 SoTs. ZAK. 77, HAZARD & SHAPIRO 127-28, 2 Soy.
STAT. & DEC. No. 3, at 38 (1966).
In the spirit of the educative role of State Arbitrazh, see the tasks set out in the
Statute on State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, [1961] Zak. Akty
745 (Legislative Acts 1960), 2 Soy. STAT. & DEc. No. 1, at 5 (1965), HAZARD &
SHAPIRO 113-16, 12 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SoviET PRESS No. 42, at 15 (1960).
Attention of the directors was called to the poor performance of the factories in this
case. The planning agencies were asked to coordinate the production and require-
ments of all the enterprises which manufacture insulating materials.
41Loeber, supra note 7, at 148. In addition, Professor Harold Berman has sug-
gested that this approach is intended to encourage enterprises to press claims for
damages against defaulting suppliers and thus recoup losses which they suffer by virtue
of their own breach of contract. BERMAN 136. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
42R.S.F.S.R. 1964 GRAZH. KOD. (Civil Code) art. 222.
4 s BERMAN 136.
44 (State Arbitration of the Bryansk Executive Committee 1966), in [1967] 20
Soy. lusT. 32.
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pound in the second to fourth quarters of 1966. In fulfillment of the
contract, the supplier shipped 93.7 tons of compound on August 1,
1966. The purchaser refused to accept the remaining shipments, refer-
ring to a change in the technology of production and a fear that its
fondy would be removed by its superior agency-that is, that the
products could not be paid for.
The change of fondy did not come about and the supplier brought
suit for a fine in State Arbitrazh for the Bryansk Region based on
section 74 of the Statute on Deliveries of Products Intended for Pro-
duction and Technical Uses.45 The lower arbitration tribunal held
for defendant-purchaser, since the plaintiff-supplier was required by the
contract to make further shipments to the purchaser, and had failed to
do so. Upon reconsideration by the Chief Arbiter, the plaintiff's com-
mon sense argument that it would be inexpedient and wasteful to ship
goods to a purchaser who does not want them and cannot pay for
them was rejected. The Chief Arbiter described this as a unilateral
refusal on the part of the plaintiff-supplier to perform its contractual
obligations.
However, State Arbitrazh of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers,
in a letter to the Bryansk Arbitrazh, noted that refusal to receive
contracted-for goods, in violation of the supplier's plan, complicated
realization of the planned production. Since the purchaser could not
"document" its claim concerning the removal of fondy, it could not
demonstrate the exceptional circumstances which would free it from
liability. The decision, therefore, was reversed, and a fine was ex-
acted from the purchaser. The shortcomings of its superior in this
case were no excuse for the purchaser to breach its contractual obliga-
tions to other enterprises.
Fictitious fault may also be attributed to defaulting suppliers or
cooperating enterprises. A Machine Building Plant brought suit for
the exaction of the price of reactors shipped to a chemical combine.4"
The combine opposed the suit, referring to the fact that the reactors and
apparatus were shipped incomplete-without bottom corner locking
valves. At the same time, it filed a counter-claim, asking for (and re-
ceiving) a penalty for the supplier's delivery of an incomplete product.
In its petition for reconsideration, the plaintiff-supplier advanced
three arguments for collecting the invoiced amount: (1) the con-
struction of reactors was a complicated matter; (2) a sub-supplier, the
Myshega Armature Works, was supposed to prepare the valves, but
did not fulfill its obligation; and (3) it undertook measures for the
45 This provision provides for a fine of 3% of the value of the goods the intended
recipient refuses to receive. Decree of May 22, 1959, Statute on Deliveries of Products
Intended for Production and Technical Uses, § 74, [1959] Sob. Post. S.S.S.R. No. 11,
Item 68 (Collection of Decrees of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers), 2 Soy. STAT.
& DEc. No. 2, at 23, 54 (1965).
46 Bolokhovsky Machine-Building Plant v. Vinnitsky Chemical Combine (State
Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1965), in [1966] 4 Soy. IusT. 31.
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immediate shipment by the armature factory to the purchaser in order
to complete the product. Plaintiff's complaint was reviewed by the
Deputy Chief Arbiter of the State Arbitrash of the U.S.S.R. Council
of Ministers and rejected since the plaintiff did not fulfill its obligation
to make the reactors complete with valves within fifteen days of de-
livery. The contract had specified that the equipment must be complete
with valves prepared by the Myshega Works, and without these parts
the supplier did not have the right to ship the reactors.
An enterprise, then, may force a supplier in another hierarchy to
provide it with the materials to enable it to fulfill the plan and its
contracts or may sue the supplier for failure to do so. But when the
fault of a superior planning agency is attributed to an operating enter-
prise, the inferior does not have the power to bring suit in State
Arbitration against a superior in the same hierarchy; 1 such disputes
are usually resolved by administrative instructions.4" The enterprise
manager can either say to his superior, when he has been charged with
a breach of contract, "it is your fault that I could not fulfill my con-
tract, and you should compensate me for that," or he can apply for
instructions as to how to fulfill his contractual obligations before they
are breached.49
Change of Planning Act and Notice of Non-Conforming Delivery
Early, late or incomplete deliveries may be justified by changes
in planning acts if the changes are agreed upon by the superior
agencies of the disputing enterprises or if the changes are made by an
agency superior to both enterprises. In Novo-Kramatorskiy Machine-
Building Plant v. Izhorskiy Plant,"0 the seller contracted to deliver
three sets of equipment to the buyer. Two more sets, to be delivered
in the second half of the year, were ordered by the superior agency of
the buyer. Seller informed the buyer of this change before the date of
delivery, but the buyer still refused to accept the additional sets of
equipment. The seller brought suit to recover his costs. The arbitra-
tion agency decided that the buyer was liable for costs of the seller,
47 A. NOVE, THE SOVIET ECONOMY 99 (rev. ed. 1965). But see the discussion in
text accompanying notes 114-24 infra.
48 These relationships are usually referred to as matters of administrative law, as
opposed to the relations between the contract partners, which are governed by the civil
law of obligations. See Loeber, supra note 7, at 145-46.
49 Cf. Moscow Wholesale Warehouse v. Odessa Warehouse, [1959] 11 Sbornik
37 (Collection), in Loeber, supra note 7, at 156, in which a superior agency, the
Ukrainian Trade Organization, was required by State Arbitrazh to find another
purchaser for an additional 3000 cameri.s it ordered its subordinate not to accept.
The plan of distribution called for plaintiff to deliver 7400 cameras; defendant dis-
agreed with the terms and refused to accept more than 4400 cameras. Arbitrazh held
that the defendant was required to buy 7400 cameras.
For a discussion of the subsequent treatment of the fictitious fault doctrine, see
text accompanying notes 125-36 infra.
50 [1957] 6 Sbornik 38 (Collection), in Loeber, supra note 7, at 157.
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since he did not refuse to accept the goods until after the seller had
begun to incur costs.
Professor Loeber has stated that the reason for the decision was
that the change in the plan was agreed upon by the superior agencies
of both contracting parties.5  This situation is hybrid-the duty to
perform imposed by the planning agency actually altered the contract
between the parties to create rights and obligations between the two
enterprises.'52
A case to be considered with Novo-Kramatorskiy Machine-Build-
ing Plant is Warehouse in Latvian SSR v. Penza Warehouse,53 in
which two wholesale warehouses entered into a contract for the delivery
of 10,000 ladies' watches (4,000 in gold and 6,000 in steel cases). The
All-Union Chief Trade Administration, an agency superior to both
contracting parties, ordered the seller to ship 7,600 gold and 1,000 steel
watches. The buyer sued the seller for failing to deliver 1,400 watches.
State Arbitrazh held that the seller was not liable because the
agency which changed the plan had supervision over both enterprises
and because the change was, in effect, incorporated into the contract
of both parties.54 In Novo-Kramatorskiy, the change was ordered by
the superior of the buyer, and the seller sued. Here the change was
ordered by the superior of both enterprises, and buyer sued. In both
cases, the enterprise whose superior ordered a change in the production
or delivery plan prevailed; in both cases there was collaboration of sorts
by the superior agencies-in the latter case, the same agency was
superior to both parties.5
There are many disputes involving refusal to accept or to pay for
accepted goods and, apparently, fulfillment of the notice requirement
51 Loeber, supra note 7, at 157.
52 The approach Arbitrazh follows is to consider conditions essential to a legal
relationship established by the plan as having been stated in the contract. In other
words, absence of agreement as to the conditions is no reason for regarding the con-
tract as not having been completed. When two enterprises reach an agreement in
conflict with the plan, the entire contract, or the portion which contradicts the plan,
is regarded as invalid. Zamengof, Combining Guidance by State Plan and Economic
Independence in Contractual Relationships, [1963] 2 Soy. Gos. i PRAv. 33, translated
in 2 Soy. L. & GOVT No. 1, at 27, 29 (1963).
53 [1960] 14 Sbornik 58 (Collection), in Loeber, supra note 7, at 156.
54See also Construction Administration of Belovo GRES v. Belovshakhtstroi
Trust (State Arbitration of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers), in [1962] 11 SOTS.
ZAK. 92, in 2 Soy. STAT. & DEc. No. 3, at 34 (1966), in which the R.S.F.S.R. Council
of Ministers changed a construction plan, thereby relieving the purchaser of liability
for nonfulfillment of contract obligations.
55 In another dispute, local arbitrazh decided that 1,000 armature drives had to
be delivered, not 1,230, as provided in the contract. State Arbitrazh of the R.S.F.S.R.
Council of Ministers found that a modified order called for delivery of only 587, and
since the supplier, defendant in a suit for fines for failure to deliver, had delivered at
least that number, the suit was rejected. The agency from which the modified dis-
tribution order came is not evident from the report of this case, but to be consistent
with the cases discussed, see text accompanying notes 48-52 Vrpra, it would have to be
assumed that the change came from an agency superior to both enterprises, or was
agreed to by two superior agencies and automatically affected the contractual obliga-
tions. Myshega Armature Works v. Venikov Armature Works, in Zamengof, supra
note 52, at 35 n.24.
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of the Russian Civil Code by the buyer is necessary to perfect a claim
for a non-conforming delivery. 56 Another section of the Civil Code
provides:
In the event of delivery of incomplete products the buyer
must require them to be made up or replaced by complete
products and refuse to pay for them until so replaced or made
up, or, if he has already paid for them, to demand the return
of the sums paid.
If the supplier fails to complete the products within the
period agreed on by the parties, the buyer is entitled to reject
the products."r
A classic example of rightful rejection of goods not delivered on
time is Moscow Office v. Power Institute,58 in which the plaintiff de-
livered an order of pipes three months late, and two months after
defendant asked that they not be delivered because he no longer needed
them. The decision was for the defendant since he had forewarned the
supplier that he would refuse to accept the goods. 9
State Arbitrazhy have adopted a variation of the requirement of
notice by the buyer of refusal to accept or to pay for non-conforming
goods, and have allowed a supplier to protect itself against the conse-
quences of an unrealistic delivery order, which is usually not an excuse
for non-performance,' by giving notice of its intention to make a non-
conforming delivery."
66 "The buyer has the right, on notifying the seller, to reject products which are
not delivered on time, unless the contract otherwise provides." R.S.F.S.R. 1964
GRAzH. KOD. (Civil Code) art. 259 (para. 2).
67R.S.F.S.R. 1964 GRAzer. KoD. (Civil Code) art. 264 (paras. 2-3).
58 [1958] 8 Sbornik 47 (Collection), in Loeber, vspra note 7, at 160.
59 Where there is no breach by the seller, of course, the buyer cannot refuse to
accept goods. In Plant "Prozhektorniye Ugli" v. Kiev Plant, [1958] 8 Sbornik 49
(Collection), in Loeber, supra note 7, at 161, the buyer requested that the seller
terminate deliveries because the buyer no longer needed the products. The seller,
however, delivered the goods, and State Arbitrazh upheld its claim for payment on
the obvious ground that the buyer's refusal to accept was a unilateral act; it is a basic
contract principle that contracts cannot be modified by unilateral actions.
OSee, e.g., Suit of Tikhvinsky Aluminum Factory (State Arbitration of the
Bryansk Executive Committee 1966), in [1967] 20 Soy. IusT. 32, discussed in text
accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
61In Libnekht Plant v. Kuz'min Plant, [1957] 6 Sbornik 40 (Collection), in
Loeber, supra note 7, at 153, the supplier was ordered by its superior to deliver more
than its program of production called for; the enterprise informed the buyer and the
buyer's superior planning agency. Arbitrazh dismissed the buyer's complaint since
the producer complied with the applicable regulations on advance notice. The Arbiter
mentioned that the buyer's superior could find another supplier, but this case stands
for the proposition that, if the contract calls for the delivery of X amount of goods
and the plan orders the delivery of X + 1, the supplier does not have to deliver the
extra goods if it gives notice to the buyer, which can make arrangements to get the
extra goods elsewhere. The supplier is merely required to perform as promised in the
contract.
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Clearly, a seller who tenders a non-conforming delivery but gives
no notice to the buyer has no recourse,62 unless the "contract other-
wise provides." In Leningrad Optical-Mechanical Union v. Gorky
Milling Tool Factory,2 there was a contract for the delivery of milling
tools in 1966, which stipulated that the goods were to be shipped in
equal parts per quarter, and monthly within each quarter. At the
same time, a provision of the contract allowed the supplier the right
of anticipatory shipment of products without the consent of the cus-
tomer. In fulfillment of the contract, the supplier shipped in July,
1966, the goods for the fourth quarter of 1966, and demanded pay-
ment from the buyer. The buyer refused to pay on the ground that the
July delivery was a violation of the provision for equal shipments.
The R.S.F.S.R. State Arbitrazh upheld the claim of the supplier,
referring to the provision in the contract dealing with anticipatory ship-
ments. The Chief Arbiter, upon reconsideration of the case, affirmed
the result-that the buyer bears the responsibility to accept and to pay
for goods shipped early. The establishment in the contract of periods
of monthly delivery did not exclude the introduction into the contract
of a provision about the anticipatory shipment of goods.
One way the consuming enterprise can protect itself from the
seller's charge that delivery was in fulfillment of contractual obligations
and that the buyer's refusal to accept or to pay for a non-conforming
delivery was a unilateral act is to object before the conclusion of the
contract by a "Protocol of Disagreement." " Pavlodarsky Tractor
Factory v. "Armmashsnabsbita" 5 involved the buyer's refusal to pay
for compressors on the ground of incompleteness. The lower arbitrazh
awarded the purchase price to the seller, but the Deputy Chief Arbiter
of State Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers reversed the
decision and denied the factory's claim when it became apparent that,
upon entering into the contract, the buyer entered a "Protocol of Dis-
agreement" insisting that the compressors must be complete with re-
ceivers. The Pavlodarsky Factory, having received the protocol of the
62 Where 407 tons of pork were delivered ahead of time at the order of the superior
of the Azerbaydzhan Office of Meat and Fish Trade Organization (a planning agency),
the buyer, a meat combine, was damaged because it had no facilities for cold storage.
State Arbitrash decided for the buyer because the seller did not forewarn the buyer
of his intention to make a premature delivery. Baku Meat Combine v. Azerbaydzhan
Office of Meat and Fish Trade Administration, [1959] 13 Sbornik 38 (Collection),
in Loeber, mspra note 7, at 158. See also Izmailovskiy Canned Food Combine v.
Ivanovskaya Office, [1958] 8 Sbornik 48 (Collection), in Loeber, supra note 7, at
160-61 (canned vegetables delivered a month late).
63 (State Arbitration of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers 1966), in [1967]
9 Soy. IusT. 33.
14 See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra. The buyer may also protect itself
by providing in the contract for a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods for con-
formity with the contract before acceptance. Cf. UNiFORm CoMmERcLr CODE§2-606 (1) (a) -(b).
65 (State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1966), in [1967] 15
Soy. IusT. 20.
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buyer in the proper form and not having disputed it, was assumed to
have accepted it and to have obliged itself to deliver completed goods.66
Substandard Goods
The R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code of Obligations provides:
In the event of the supply of products of a quality lower
than that required by the State standard, approved technical
conditions or models, the buyer must reject the products and
refuse to pay for them, or, if the buyer has already paid, the
sum must be returned to him.
67
The problem of deliveries of substandard goods is apparently one of
great concern among Soviet lawyers and, most likely, Soviet managers.
The Chief of the Codification Group of State Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R.
Council of Ministers has stated that fully twenty per cent of the
disputes before State Arbitrazh involve the quality of products de-
livered.6" Arbitrazh has recognized, according to him, that delivery
contracts should include specifications as to quality, corresponding to
the minimum standards set by the appropriate state committee. Evi-
dently the sanctions, if any, involved in the planning procedure are
inadequate to influence manufacturers to meet the established state-
imposed standards. The application of ordinary contract rights and
remedies is suggested. Enterprises are urged not to pay for sub-
standard goods and, if they do, to demand their money back. In
addition, state agencies such as banks are encouraged to bring financial
influence upon enterprises which ship inferior products.6 9
What is most important is "continuous improvement in the quality
of production," which is a "paramount economic-political task." 11 The
Soviets evidently feel that enforcement through horizontal contractual
rights and obligations will be more effective than sanctions imposed
for breach of the vertical duty to perform under the plan. Consequently,
the present approach of Arbitrazh is not far removed from the im-
position of absolute liability on suppliers of defective or substandard
goods. For example, in Chelyabinsk Office of "Rosbakalei" v.
66 A case in which a Protocol of Disagreement probably would not have been very
helpful, and in which the buyer should not be entitled to refuse acceptance, is described
by Professor Loeber: it was a dispute between two warehouses in which the buyer
tried to justify refusal to pay for goods delivered on the ground that there was no
longer any public demand for them. Decision was, not surprisingly, for the seller.
At the time of the signing of the contract, the goods probably were in demand; it was,
evidently, only later that the buyer realized the demand was not as great as it had
anticipated. Kostroma Warehouse v. Dnepropetrovsk Warehouse, [1960] 13 Sbornik
41, in Loeber, supra note 7, at 161.
107 R.S.F.S.R. 1964 GRAzH. KoD. (Civil Code) art. 261.
6 8 Liberman, supra note 9, at 47.
6 9 Letter of Instruction of the State Arbitration Agency under the USSR Coun-
cil of Ministers, March 29, 1962, in Liberman, supra note 9, at 48.
70Id. at 55.
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Uvarovsky Sugar Plant,' the plaintiff received shipments of badly-
caked sugar. State Arbitrazh established that the caking was the result
of failures in the technology of the production process. Defendant
argued on appeal that the defects were the result of prolonged storage
at the buyer's warehouse and that, in any event, the time tor veri-
fication of the quality of the sugar by the buyer had expired. Con-
sidering itself not at fault in the delivery of the substandard sugar, the
defendant requested a change in decision. The Chief Arbiter of the
State Arbitrazh of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, on the contrary,
established that the sugar was substandard when it was shipped and
exacted from the supplier the price of the sugar, as well as a fine for
substandard delivery.
It is not always so easy to establish who is responsible for the
defective goods. In such a situation, the arbitration agencies are even
more likely to hold the immediate supplier absolutely responsible. A
Kazan department store received slipcovers produced by a textile plant
and shipped in cheesecloth bags which had traces of mold from
dampness. The supplier, the Tatar Republic trade base, denied all
liability as to quality since it received the slipcovers by water transport
from another trade base and forwarded them the very next day by
truck to the department store.72 State Arbitrash of the R.S.F.S.R.
Council of Ministers awarded damages to the department store, stating
that defendant, once it observed that the bags were dirty and torn,
was obliged to ship goods of acceptable quality. Since it was im-
possible to determine where the defects arose-at the manufacturer,
at the other trade base or in transport-defendant was held liable.
73
A dispute reflecting one of the most serious concerns motivating
the economic revisions of the last six years "4 occurred between a
Moscow warehouse and a porcelain factory.75 The contract between the
factory and the warehouse required the delivery of dishes to a number
of buyers listed in the warehouse's distribution order (raznaryadok).
The factory overfulfilled its plan of production (in number of dishes),
but did not fulfill the planned value of the dishes.7 1 In other words,
they supplied cheaper dishes. The buyer's suit for damages for in-
71 (State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1967), in [1967] 18
Soy. IUST. 31.
72 Tatar Trade Base "Rostorgadezhda" v. Kazan Department Store (State Arbi-
tration of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers 1967), in [1967] 12 Sov. IUST. 31.
73 See also Trust of Mineral Geology v. "Neftaburmashremont" (State Arbitra-
tion of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1965), in [1966] 6 Soy. IUST. 32 (incomplete
drilling rigs shipped by sub-supplier; shipper held liable to purchaser, with suit over
against manufacturer).
74 See text accompanying notes 79-148 infra.
75 Moscow Wholesale Warehouse v. Dulevsky Porcelain Plant, [1958] 9 Sbornik
54 (Collection), in Loeber, supra note 7, at 153-54.
76 The supplier delivered dishes with a value of 48,000,000 (pre-1961) rubles,
about $5,200,0000, whereas the distribution order called for the production of 55,000,000
(pre-19 6 1 ) rubles, about $6,050,000, worth of dishes.
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complete delivery was dismissed since the factory fulfilled its production
plan! 77
What the arbitrazh ignored was that the factory only fulfilled part
of its plan-the number of dishes to be produced-but failed to fulfill
the planned value of the order. The case, decided ten years ago, in-
dicates an obsession with output rather than sales. The plan called
for so many dishes, and the factory produced that many plus almost
six per cent more.S It was not important to the producer that the
dishes shipped were not the ones ordered, or of the wrong price, because
the manager knew that the dishes could be sold in any event. The
obvious inference from this decision is that the buyer had to pay no
more than forty-eight million rubles, the value of the dishes shipped.
But why should he not be entitled to damages as well, especially if one
of the warehouse's customers refused to pay for the dishes because they
are not those ordered?
THE NEW ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT: A DIALOGUE
As it celebrates its fiftieth anniversary,79 the Soviet Union is
implementing a number of proposed changes in its economic system in
order to stimulate efficient production and improve the quality of con-
sumer goods and of manufacturing generally. These changes will affect
the functions of Arbitrazh within the system; to discover the role of
the law of State Arbitrazh in this new order, let us imagine the fol-
lowing dialogue between the first Chief Arbiter of State Arbitrazah of
the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers-an old Bolshevik-and Premier
Alexei Kosygin.
Arbiter: The history of contracts and arbitration boards in the
Soviet Union was intertwined with the administration of the economy
in the first decade and a half of Bolshevik rule. Arbitration commis-
sions were first created in 1922 80 to operate certain expropriated in-
dustries. Several years later, a Supreme Arbitration Commission of
the U.S.S.R. was established to hear disputes of an all-union nature."'
All along, the emphasis was on wise administrative decisions rather
than on the consistent application of the law of obligations."2
'7 See text accompanying notes 146-47 infra for a discussion of how this case
would be decided today.
7sHigh over-production is quite unusual because, under the so-called "ratchet!'
principle, the next year's delivery order would be geared to the higher figure. In
other words, the manager tries to overfulfill his target, but not by too much. As
Professor Nove put it, writing before the reform, "a wise director fulfills the plan 105
per cent, not 125 per cent." Nove, The Problem of "Success Indicators" in the Soviet
Industry, in READINGS ON THE SovMrT EcoNomiY 433, 436 (F. Holzman ed. 1963).
79 Hail to the glorious Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revo-
lution 1
80 Decree of Sept. 21, 1922, [1922] 1 Sob. Zak. S.S.S.R. No. 60, Item 769 (Col-
lection of Laws of the U.S.S.R.).8 1 Decree of May 6, 1924, [1924] 1 Sob. Zak. S.S.S.R. No. 62, Item 618 (Col-
lection of Laws of the U.S.S.R.).
82 Hazard, Flexibility of Law in Soviet State Arbitration, in INrTMNATirONAL
ARBrnATioN 120, 122-23 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
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The existence of arbitration commissions ping-ponged during the
period of the first "Five-Year Plan." ' An arbitration department
was created by the Supreme Council of National Economy (under the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers) for the adjudication of disputes between
state enterprises.84 Two weeks after its creation, this department was
abolished by the decree of March 4, 1931, returning the jurisdiction
of all such disputes to the court; 8 two months later, the policy was
again reversed and the administrative department of State Arbitrazh
was re-established.86 The operation of Arbitrazh then continued
throughout the period of the five-year plans.
Kosygin: Allow me to update this discussion by describing the
new economic system announced in 1965, and then perhaps you would
83The following approximately indicates the initial periods of Soviet economic
development and the concomitant role of contracts and arbitration commissions.
( 1918 )
( ) Centralized supply
( 1919 )
War ( ) No contracts; no arbitration
Communism (1920 )
( 1921 ) Contracts reintroduced( )
( 1922 ) Arbitration commissions created; courts hear most
( ) disputes; law codified
(1923)
New ( )
Economic ( 1924 ) Supreme Arbitration Commission
Policy ( )
(NEP) (1925 )( )
(1926 )( )
(1927 )
( 1928 ) First Five-Year Plan
( ) Administrative orders




( 1931 ) Planned contracts; arbitration abolished, then re-
( ) created
(1932 )
84 Decree of Feb. 18, 1931, [1931] 1 Sob. Zak. S.S.S.R. No. 10, Item 109 (Col-
lection of Laws of the U.S.S.R.), in HAZARD & SHAPIRo 98.
S5 Decree of March 4, 1931, [1931] 1 Sob. Zak. S.S.S.R. No. 14, Item 135 (Col-
lection of Laws of the U.S.S.R.), in HAZARD & SHAPIRO 98.
86 Decree of May 3, 1931, [1931] 1 Sob. Zak. S.S.S.R. No. 26, Item 203 (Col-
lection of Laws of the U.S.S.R.), in HAZARD & SHAPIRO 98. Hazard and Shapiro
describe this period simply as "chaos." Id.
87 The touchstone of the reform movement is Premier Kosygin's Report to the
Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union in September, 1965, Pravda, Sept. 28, 1965, translated in 17 CURRNrT DIGEST
OF THE SovIET PRESS No. 38, at 3 (1965).
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tell me how you think the law of Arbitrazh-and indeed, the system
of arbitral tribunals-is affected.
The essence of the reform is the shift of a considerable amount of
decision-making from planning agencies to the enterprises themselves.
The principle of central planning, however, has been retained by placing
the enterprises under the control of industrial ministries, thus elim-
inating much of the overlap of planning organs."8
The prime change of emphasis for the individual enterprise is that
the incentive to fulfill the planned tasks is now related to volume of
sales; the manager of an enterprise can no longer be satisfied with
fulfilling or overfulfilling a plan of physical output, since as a seller,
he gets no credit for output until the goods are sold. In 1962, Pro-
fessor Liberman of Kharkov University officially formulated his pro-
posal that the main criterion of success of an enterprise's operation
should be its volume of sales."9 In accordance with this suggestion, the
long, detailed list of planned "indicators" has been reduced con-
siderably, and the enlarged powers of the managers have been specified
in a new Statute for State Enterprises."
Arbiter: I know that the reforms have been widespread 91 and
88 The first important change made in the structure of the Soviet economy was
the abolition of the regional economic councils (sovnarkhoay), which were established
in 1957. For a description of the shortcomings of the somarkhoz system, see
H. SCHWARTZ, THE SovsET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN 148-58 (1965). A general law
on the organization and operation of the Ministries was enacted in 1967. General
Statute on USSR Ministries, Decree of July 10, 1967, No. 640, Ekonomicheskaya
Gazeta, Aug. 22, 1967, at 7, 6 Soy. L. & GoV'T No. 2, at 3 (1967), 19 CURRENT DIGEST
OF THE Sovixr PREss No. 37, at 3 (1967).
89 Pravda, Sept 9, 1962, translated in 14 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS
No. 36, at 13 (1962), reprinted with some omissions as Liberman, The Plan, Profits
and Bonuses, in THE Sovm=- ECONOMY 352-58 (M. Bornstein & D. Fusfeld eds. 1966).
Professor Nove has summarized the terms of the proposals, iot all of which were
adopted by the September 1965 Plenum, in Nove, Revamping the Economy, 12 PROB-
LEmS OF CommuNisM No. 1, at 10, 13 (1963).
One observer has claimed that the most significant aspect of the Liberman pro-
posals is that they aroused unreserved criticism of long-standing policies and theories,
and heated debate over the advisability of a revision of the planning methods. Shaffer,
A New Incentive for Soviet Managers, 22 RussIAN REv. 410, 416 (1963).
90 Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise (U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers 1965), Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Oct. 20, 1965, at 25, 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC.
No. 3, at 52 (1966), 17 CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SovrT PRESS No. 42, at 3 (1965),
JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVIcE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE (Pub. No. 32,685,
1965). The spirit of the reforms pervades the statute. Article 29 reflects the major
change in production activities of state enterprises; it seeks to prevent the manufacture
of unwanted goods by two devices: making non-fulfillment of delivery plans a gross
violation of state discipline, and prohibiting production above the planned level unless
arrangements have been made for the disposal of the goods.
The rights of state enterprises have been expanded to include the rights: (1) to
establish direct economic links between supplier and consumer [art. 30] ; (2) to pre-
vent orders that are impossible to fulfill, to require mutually consistent planned assign-
ments, and to require that superior organs guarantee the necessary fondy [art. 46] ;
(3) to prevent plan changes unless there is a full adjustment of all contractual rela-
tions involved [art. 47] ; and (4) to refuse excess or unnecessary products upon timely
notice [art. 62]. See Maggs, Soviet Corporation Law: The New Statute on the
Socialist State Production Enterprise, 14 Am. J. Comp. L. 478 (1965).
91 Professor Liberman, in an article written for western consumption, reported at
the end of the first quarter of 1967 that "more than 2,200 enterprises, including almost
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eminently successful,92 but for my purposes I should like to find out
whether stress is now placed on direct contracts between enterprises,
rather than on obligatory contracts entered into under a plan.
Kosygin: Considerable stress is placed on direct contracting, in
order to allow managers to use resources with maximum effectiveness
and to free planners from the tasks of issuing complex commands.
Arbiter: This is precisely what I expected. The history I de-
scribed has shown that when civil law contracts predominated, the
courts usually had jurisdiction of disputes in accordance with the civil
law principles of obligations. 3 Are you suggesting that the arbitration
tribunals will again be abolished, as they were in 1931 ? "' After all,
the distinction between the administrative arbitration tribunals and the
ordinary judicial courts is becoming slight.
Kosygin: I definitely do not foresee the abolition of the structure
of State Arbitrazh, leaving all disputes between state enterprises to the
competence of the People's Courts. But there is a marked trend toward
stability, both in the law applied by State Arbitrazh and in the arbitra-
tion process itself.95 As the American Professor Hazard has said,
"[T]he arbitration tribunals have been moving away from the position
given them when they were brought into being in their present form in
1931 . . . . They have come nearer to the position of a court
all the instrument manufacturing plants, many light-industry factories and mills, and
ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical plants are . . . operating under the new system
." Liberman, The Soviet Economic Reform, 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 54, 56 (1967).
It is not known, however, what percentage of the total output of the Soviet Union these
2,200 plants represent. The official summary of statistics reports that by the end of the
first quarter of 1968, "there have been converted to the new system of planning and
economic incentive about 10,000 industrial enterprises, comprising almost one-half of
all industrial production." After listing the ministries in which all of the enterprises
are under the new system, the summary concludes that all enterprises under the new
conditions overfulfilled the plan for the first quarter of 1958, both as to production
and as to profit. Pravda, Apr. 18, 1968, at 2.
92 But see the conclusion that "In terms of announced Soviet intentions, the reform
was a modest success." Frankel, Economic Reform: A Tentative Appraisal, 16 PROB-
LEMS OF COMMUNISm No. 3, at 29, 41 (1967) (emphasis added). Apparently, the
pioneer plants on the new system were all unusually high in profitability before the
change. Bush, The Reforms: A Balance Sheet, 16 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNIsm No. 4,
at 30, 32 (1967).
93 See note 83 supra.
94 See text accompanying notes 79-86 supra. The Bolshevik's concern is justified,
since he has read about the characteristics of State Arbitrazh in 1931, described by
the American Sovietologists, Hazard and Shapiro, as follows: (1) judges specializing
in relationships of public corporations; (2) performance of the plan as the ultimate
object of the administration of rules; (3) directors of corporations and professional
arbitrators to participate-no legal advisers [jurisconsults] ; and (4) damages and
penalties a secondary concern. HAZARD & SHAPIRO 98.
Of these concerns, only the last assumes considerable importance under the new
system of economic management. Under a system which emphasizes the civil law of
obligations, there is no need for judges specializing in the law of state corporations;
the "performance of the plan" is no longer the polestar in the administration of the
Soviet economy; and there is certainly an increased role for jurisconsults in the arbi-
tration process.
!95 Hazard, supra note 81, at 126.
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charged with the protection of 'rights' through the stable application
of law." 96 There are several themes of the reform that must be carried
out, all leading to the stabilization of law and procedure of Soviet State
Arbitrazh.
First, recentralization of the arbitration structure. In the spirit
of the September 1965 Plenum, the organs of Soviet State Arbitrazh
must be centralized. Since 1931, the system has been without vertical
subordination of arbitration tribunals, and superior arbitrazhy have
not had the power to review the decisions of lower agencies in matters
relating to the competency of the latter." Under the discarded
sovnarkhoz system,9 each economic council issued its own rules on
arbitration, giving rise to many claims and manifestations of localism,
especially, it seems, in disputes involving the delivery of meat and live-
stock.99 Many of these rules are still operative.
This is intolerable. A single set of rules and regulations must be
published to ensure that the union and republican tribunals are sub-
ordinated to the central arbitral boards so that arbitration practice is
uniform. 00 The higher arbitrazhy should check the activities of the
lower agencies and appoint their Chief Arbiters. 1
The suggestion has been voiced that it would be expedient to
transfer review of the legality of decisions handed down by local
arbitrazhy to the republican state arbitration tribunals. 02 The increase
in the volume of cases of the republican arbitrazhy would be com-
pensated for by a broadening of the jurisdiction of the local tribunals,
96d. at 129-30.
9T Gavrilenko & Pobirchenko, Strukturn gositdarstvennovo arbitrazha n yroven'
zadach novoy khozyaistvennoy reformy (Bringing up the Structure of State Arbitra-
tion to the Level of the Tasks of the New Economic Reform), [1966] 6 Soy. Gos. x
PRAv. 45.
s See note 88 supra.
99 In a typical case, the defense to a suit for failure to deliver meat was that the
seller's supplier did not fulfill his plan of delivering cattle. Plaintiff's suit was upheld
when it became evident that defendant had adequate supplies but preferred to deliver
the meat for local needs first. Kirgiz Office of the Chief Meat and Fish Trade Ad-
ministration v. Frunze Meat Combine, [1958] 8 Sbornik 40 (Collection), in Loeber,
supra note 7, at 149. See also Semipalatinsk Office of "Skotoimport" v. Semipalatinsk
Meat Combine, [1963] 21 Sbornik 101 (Collection), in 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 3, at
31 (1966), Loeber, supra note 7, at 153; Kirov Meatpacking Plant v. Volhniya Re-
gional Office, [1962] 19-20 Sbornik 35 (Collection), in 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 3, at
29 (1966).
100 Ironically, a call for the elimination of dual subordination in State Arbitrazh
was made by the Soviets in 1958, immediately after the adoption of the sovnarkhozy.
Sadovsky & Feofanov, Is This What Arbitration Should be Like?, Izvestia, Aug. 21,
1958, translated in 10 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 34, at 21 (1958).
The problem was also noted as early as 1961 by a British lawyer who visited the
Soviet Union. Johnson, Planning and Contract Law, 12 Soy. STUDIES 263, 264 n.11
(1961).
101 Ordynsky, Problems in the Work of State Arbitration Agencies inder the
New Industrial Management Conditions, [1966] 5 Soy. lUST. 4, translated in JOINT
PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERvICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TRANSLATIONS ON SOVIET
LAW AND SOCIAL REGULATIONS 6-7 (Pub. No. 37,626, 1966).
102 Geshlina, Nyekotoriye normy polozheniy o gosarbitrazha nyzhdayutsa v
iznenyeniy (Some Provisions of the Statute on State Arbitration Must be Revised),
[1966] 12 Soy. Gos. I PAv. 71, 73.
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for example, by raising their jurisdictional maximum amount to 7,000
rubles in contract disputes and to 700,000 rubles in pre-contract cases.'03
Second, courts of conciliation. In light of the possibility of an
increased workload for local arbitrazhy, we must turn our attention to
an alternate means of settling disputes between state enterprises.
Arbitrazh is an administrative court, specializing in economic disputes;
it is not a conciliation agency in the western sense of "arbitration," that
is, a procedure for effecting compromises between the parties. There
are such conciliation courts in the Soviet Union, known as treteiskiye
sudy, and they derive their competence from section 4 of the Statute on
State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, which provides
that "Individual economic disputes may, by mutual consent of the
parties,'0 be transferred for resolution by a court of conciliation chosen
by the parties to consider the case." "' The operation of the conciliation
courts is governed by Temporary Rules; 106 they are competent to
consider any dispute which is within the jurisdiction of State Arbitrazh.
Although it has already been eight years since the promulgation
of the Temporary Rules, conciliation courts have not been widely
utilized. Enterprises rarely resort to them, 0 7 and one reason for this
is the cumbersome procedure established by the Rules for the election
of these courts.'0 Therefore, it would be advisable to establish a public
institute of courts of conciliation for local councils, which would make
recommendations for the composition of the courts from a panel of
economists and technocrats.
The Temporary Rules should be amended to stipulate the ob-
ligation of local economic enterprises to transfer disputes for resolution
by the courts of conciliation; arbitrazhy in such situations should not
accept such suits.'09 In addition, state arbitration agencies must give
103 Id.
104 If the defendant does not reply to the request to transfer a case to a court of
conciliation or to choose a judge, the decision of the conciliation agency lacks legal
force; such a dispute may only be heard by a state Arbitrash. Perevoz District In-
dustrial Combine v. Construction Unit of Arzamas Building Trust No. 7, [1962] 18
Sbornik 48 (Collection), in 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 69 (1965).
105 Statute on State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers § 4, [1961]
Zak. Akty 745 (Legislative Acts 1960), 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 5 (1965),
HAZARD & SHAPIRO 113-16, 12 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS No. 42, at 15
(1960).
106 Temporary Rules of Consideration of Economic Disputes by a Court of Con-
ciliation [and Instructions in connection therewith] [1964] Instr. Ukaz. 60 (Directive
Instructions 1960), 2 Sov. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 57 (1965). The purpose of the
courts of conciliation is to develop "democratic forms of resolution of economic dis-
putes," rather than to rely on the compulsory implementation of arbitration orders.
Temporary Rules § 1.
10 7 See Letter of Instruction of July 20, 1961, [1962] 18 Sbornik 17 (Collection),
2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 64 (1965).
108 Yershov, 0 Praktike gorkovskovo gosarbitrazha po printenyeniyou novykh
pravil rassmatreniya xosyaistvennykh sporov gosudarstvennymi arbitrashami (On
the Practive of the Gorky State Arbitrazh concerning the Application of the New
Regulations on the Settlement of Disputes arising in the Sphere of National Economy
by State Arbitration Tribunals), [1966] 2 Soy. Gos. I PRAy. 87.
109 See id.
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active support to the courts of conciliation, assist them in transferring
disputes, and bring the Temporary Rules to the attention of the
parties."n
Third, compulsory implementation. In effectuating the rapid reso-
lution of pre- and post-contract disputes, Arbitrazh relies, in the first
instance, upon the voluntary implementation by the parties of an
arbitration decision."' However, there is also provision for man-
datory execution of the decision following the lapse of a specified
time."2 The distressingly large number of such compulsory orders
indicates that the principle of voluntary compliance must be reworked.
An amendment to the Statute on State Arbitration has been proposed
to introduce a general procedure whereby a compulsory order would be
issued simultaneously with decision." 3  Arbitrazh would establish a
period for the voluntary fulfillment of the decision if, according to the
nature of the decision, it could not be fulfilled quickly, or if defendant
should petition for the period." 4 This would eliminate the undesirable
consequences of red tape and delay in the receipt of funds and the
mistaken payment of fines.
Fourth, pre-contract disputes. The rapid resolution of pre-
contract disputes is vital to the essence of the reforms-increased inde-
pendent decision-making by enterprise directors. Since the range of
indicators to the managers is considerably diminished, the enterprise
now fulfills its production plan on the basis of completed contracts;
contract terms such as quantity, quality, assortment and order of
delivery have replaced many of the commanded indicators of superiors.
Perhaps disputes over such terms are not legal in nature and can best
be resolved by the superior agencies of the contracting partners. But
the transfer of such disputes to the higher agencies would fly in the face
of the spirit of the reform, which seeks to maximize non-interference
of planning agencies in the activities of economic enterprises.
In this context, Comrade Kleyn, a member of the All-Union
Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation, has made a startling
proposal: that enterprises must be allowed to challenge orders of an
110 A letter from the State Arbitrash of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers de-
scribes the "significant assistance" that the arbitrazh of the Moscow Regional Execu-
tive Committee rendered by conducting a conference on the courts of conciliation.
Letter of Instruction of Nov. 28, 1961, [1962] 19-20 Sbornik 4 (Collection), 2 Soy.
STAT. & Dnc. No. 1, at 66 (1965).
Ill Statute on State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers § 12 (para.
1), [1961] Zak. Akty 745 (Legislative Acts 1960), 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 5
(1965), HAZARD & SHARo 113-16, 12 CURRENT DiGEsT OF THE Sov=r PREss, No. 42,
at 15 (1960).
112 Id. § 12 (para. 2). But see the procedure in the courts of conciliation, which
requires the mutual consent of the parties, described in the text accompanying notes
104-110 supra. Under the present arbitration statute, such a procedure is envisioned
under exceptional circumstances.
13Id. at § 12 (para. 3).
114 Geshlina, supra note 102, at 72.
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economic management agency by way of State Arbitrzah.n" It is
presently impossible for an enterprise to "sue" its superior in Arbitrazh
to rescind an unrealistic delivery order or to recover damages for failure
to supply it with the necessary raw materials to fulfill its contractual
obligations,"' even though the shortcomings of the superior may be
attributed to the enterprise.17  Enterprises were virtually compelled
to undertake contractual obligations that were impossible to fulfill.
Comrade Kleyn argues that ever since enterprises were granted the
right to refuse to conclude contracts for the delivery of unwanted
goods,"" State Arbitrazh has had a right to refuse to compel them to
enter into contracts that do not correspond to their economic activity."
9
It has been asserted that "[c]hanges in the administrative and planning
system make it necessary to create new legal norms, which protect the
enterprise against the presently existing unlawful intervention of
higher agencies within its competence." 120
There are indications that this change in the jurisdiction of State
Arbitrazh may already be taking place. One such indication was a suit
by the Moscow Central Knitting Base, a planning agency, to require
the Kosinsk Knitting Plant, its subordinate, to conclude an additional
contract for the delivery of knitted goods based on a change of the
planning act. Since the plant was operating under the new economic
management, and the superior neither provided the plant with the
additional raw materials nor made changes in inter-related plans, State
Arbitrazh of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers refused to order the
consummation of the contract.'
21
An arbitrazh, it is argued, is the best agency for determining the
legality of a planning order because it is a disinterested organ with an
established fact-finding apparatus. In addition, Arbitrazh can apply an
effective sanction by revoking the "illegal" order involved.'
2
This proposition apparently has the approval of a majority in the
Institute of Government and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the
115 Kleyn, Arbitration and the Consolidation of Legality in the National Economy,
[1967] 8 Soy. Gos. I PRAv. 51, translated in JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESFARCH SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF COIMMERCE, USSR ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY, GENERAL INFORMATION 1,
12 (PUB. No. 42,813, 1967).
"
6 See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
117 See text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
118 See note 90 supra.
119 Kleyn, supra note 115, at 7-8.
120 Id. at 10 (emphasis added). "The arbitration practice of recent years, as a
rule, does not attribute legal significance to changes in production plans, if the changes
were not coordinated with the trading organizations, or if a plan was changed despite
the objections of the trading organizations." Id. at 8. See, e.g., Novo-Kramatorskiy
Machine Building Plant v. Izhorskiy Plant, [1957] 6 Sbornik 38 (Collection), in
Loeber, supra note 7, at 157; Warehouse in Latvian SSSR v. Penza Warehouse,
[1960] 14 Sbornik 58 (Collection), in Loeber, supra note 7, at 156, discussed in the
text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
121 Kleyn, mpra note 115, at 11.
122 Id. at 13-14.
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U.S.S.R.; 123 to doubt the expediency of the suggestion, according to
the Institute, would be to nullify the independence of the contracting
enterprises in the resolution of important economic disputes. 24 Pro-
vision, therefore, must be made to stabilize the procedure for an enter-
prise to "bring suit" in State Arbitrazh against its superior to determine
the appropriateness and legality of a planning order. Thus, an entirely
new perspective is introduced into the role of State Arbitrazh: the
obligation to oversee the process of plan implementation not only by
resolving contract disputes between operating enterprises, but also by
intervening in the vertical relationship between an inferior enterprise
and its planning superior.
Fifth, the concept of fault. The increased role of Arbitrazh in
settling administrative 125 disputes introduces the most perplexing
dilemma now facing us-whether the only basis of contractual liability
of an enterprise should be fault. The matter would seem to have been
disposed of by article 37 of the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of
the U.S.S.R., which reads:
A person who fails to perform an obligation or performs it
improperly incurs material liability for damages . . . only
in the presence of fault (intentional or negligent) except in
cases provided by law or contract.' 26
The meaningful question, however, is which "person" must be
at fault. The doctrine of attribution of fault '2 7 has been used by
Arbitrazh when it could not be shown that the manager or workers of
an enterprise were actually to blame for non-delivery; the enterprise, as
a legal "person," was held responsible, even though (due to the com-
plication of economic ties) the "guilty" party was a co-operating enter-
prise, perhaps far along the chain of suppliers, or the enterprise's su-
perior planning agency.
One solution is to grant State Arbitrazh the power to discipline
officials of enterprises guilty of violations of contractual obligations,1
28
123 The proceedings of a Conference of the Institute in December, 1966, at which
time State Arbitration was discussed, are reported in Obsuzhdeniye pravovykh voprosol
ekonomicheskoy reformy (Discussion of Legal Questions of the Economic Reform),
[1967] 4 Sov. Gos. I PRAv. 132, 135.
124 Id.
1 25 See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
126 Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. art. 37, [1961] Ved. Verkh.
Soy. S.S.S.R. No. 50, Item 525 (Sup. Soy. U.S.S.R. 1961). The Fundamentals (or
Principles) were adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and served as the
basis for the civil codes of the union republics. See, e.g., R.S.F.S.R. 1964 GAzir.
KOD. (Civil Code) art. 222.
Translations of the Fundamentals appear in in SoviET CIVIi LEGISLATION AND
PROcFDuRE 55-114 (1963), 14 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIEr PRESS No. 4, at 3
(1962), and 3 Soy. REv. No. 5, at 22 (1962), 3 Sov. REv. No. 6, at 50 (1962), 3 Soy.
REV. No. 7, at 26 (1962), 3 Soy. REv. No. 8, at 41 (1962).
12 7 See text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
12 8 See note 9 supra.
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and, also, to discipline employees of economic planning organs who
approve unrealistic plans of production. 9 But it is more desirable to
reorganize Gosarbitrazh into a "contract court" which will enhance
the role of the contract and have the desirable added consequence
of stabilizing the substantive provisions on liability. 3 °
The commentators who call for rigid adherence to the principle
of fault as the basis of contractual responsibility 131 would presumably
enhance the concept of fictitious fault, freeing State Arbitrazh from any
responsibility for investigating the underlying reasons for non-conform-
ing deliveries." 2 In accordance with a decision to allow Arbitrazhy to
consider challenges to the legality of planning orders," liability should
be imposed on the joint entity of the enterprise and its superior. How-
ever, the operating plant should now be free to recover from its superior
agency any damages or fines exacted, if it can be shown that the
enterprise, at an early stage, challenged the appropriateness of the plan-
ning order which induced it to breach a contractual obligation.
In the case of a defaulting supplier in another ministerial or
departmental hierarchy, a defendant should be entitled to implead the
supplier in the original Arbitrazh suit.'3 ' When considering such
suits for breach of contract, Arbitrazh should require defendant to have
taken ordinary measures to obtain materials or funds elsewhere before
it will allow a reduction of liability in accordance with the amount of
materials that the impleaded defendant failed to produce or ship as
required in the contract. In addition, the impleaded defendant should
pay to the prime defendant damages including not only the fine, but
also indirect losses such as lost profits."
In short, in a suit by a buyer against a defaulting seller, State
Arbitrazh should broadly construe the statutory term "person" to
include both the enterprise and its superiors. In subsequent claims by
the seller against the defaulting suppliers or superiors, the concept of
129 Rabinovich, Vina kak osnovaniye dogovornoy otvetsvennosti sotsialisticheskovo
predpriyatiya (Fault as the Basis of Contractual Liability of a Socialist Enterprise),
[1966] 6 Soy. Gos. i PRAv. 30, 37. The author is the State Arbiter of the Moscow
City Executive Committee Arbitrazh.
'
3 0 See notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Rabinovich, supra note 129.
132 It should be impossible, Rabinovich maintains, to prove fault of an enterprise
in the absence of fault of its managers. Id. at 32.
133 See text accompanying notes 115-24 ,supra.
134 There are three prototype disputes arising now, each of which demands a dif-
ferent solution. The first situation is a dispute between two enterprises, both of which
are still planned as before. There is no reason to remove such disputes from the com-
petency of State Arbitration. The second and third situations involve enterprises
on the profit system. A dispute between two enterprises operating under the new
incentive arrangement, or a disagreement between one enterprise which operates under
the reforms and one which operates under the planned method might necessitate some
collegium or combination of the Arbitration panel and experts of the law of obliga-
tions, perhaps civil judges or the foremost leaders of industry. In the latter situations,
it is desirable to have both an expert in the law of the planned economy and an expert
in the civil law of obligations.
135 Sikirin & Falkovich, The Principle: Mutual Responsibility, abstracted in 18
CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIEr PRESS, No. 12-11, at 4 (1966).
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"fault" should be narrowly interpreted to impose an ordinary reason-
ableness standard on the part of the managers of enterprises and their
responsible officials. " 6
Sixth, the wholesale price structure. A task of the reform of
economic management is to ensure the profitability of every operating
enterprise.13 7 The profitability of an enterprise is based, to a great
extent, on the price at which it can sell its output. The economic
managers realized that the fixed-price structure in the Soviet Union
was far from being rational. The first price revisions went into effect
in October, 1966, and by July, 1967, the entire system was revised. 8
Now that the price of a product is an important condition of the delivery
contract, it is incumbent to reexamine the arbitration practice in price
disputes.
Under the present law, state arbitration tribunals cannot consider
"disputes over the establishment of prices for products subject to de-
livery" if the prices are set by actual legislation.'89 What this means is
that every contract must make specific mention of the price of the
product by reference to an official price list, and Arbitrazh has the
power to invalidate contracts that specify prices in violation of the
fixed prices. 4 9 If there is no established price, contracts are not always
voided; Arbitrazh may suspend the consideration of the dispute and
request a determination of the applicable price by the appropriate
superior planning organ.' 4 '
A major breakthrough came when managers of supplier-enterprises
were granted the right, under certain circumstances, to establish the
price of goods with the agreement of the buyer.' The logic of the
136 This decision is compelled by a reading of the "Rights of the Socialist Enter-
prise": "Rights belonging to an enterprise that are connected with its production and
economic activity shall be exercised by the director (manager, chief) and ... by other
officials of the enterprise . . . ." Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise
§ 41 (U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1965), Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Oct. 20, 1965,
at 25, 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 3, at 52 (1966), 17 CURENT DIGEST OF THE Sovmr
PRnss No. 42, at 3 (1965), JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARcH SmvIcE, U.S. DEP'T OF
CoMMERcE (Pub. No. 32,685, 1965). If the rights are to be exercised by the managers,
they should bear the responsibility for breaches of obligations.
'.37 Yakovets, Price and the Reform, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Aug. 11, 1967, trans-
lated in JoINr PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SEavicE, U.S. DEI'T OF COMMERCE, USSR
EcoNOMY AND INDUSTRY, GENERAL INFORMATION 8, 10 (Pub. No. 42,527, 1967).
1 8 Id. at 9. The tendency was for prices of heavy industrial materials to rise
approximately 157%'; the prices of natural raw materials increased considerably more.
Id.
139 Statute on State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers § 15(f),
11961] Zak. Akty 745 (Legislative Acts 1960), 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC. No. 1, at 5
(1965), HAZARD & SHAPIRO 113-16, 12 CURRENT DicEsT OF THE SoVIr PREss No. 42,
at 15 (1960).
140 Letter of Instruction of April 28, 1967 (State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R.
Council of Ministers), [1967] 9 SoTs. ZAK. 89.
141 Johnson, Planning and Contract Law, 12 Soy. STUD Es 263, 269 (1961).
142Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise § 74 (U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers 1965), Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Oct. 20, 1965, at 25, 2 Soy. STAT. & DEC.
No. 3, at 52 (1966), 17 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PREss No. 42, at 3 (1965),
JOINT PUBLICATioNS REsEAR H SEavIcn, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE (Pub. No. 32,685,
1965).
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new economic management compels the conclusion that arbitration
tribunals should be allowed to adjudicate disputes over the establishment
of such prices. State Arbitrazh always has been competent to resolve
disputes concerning prices. It has determined the price of goods when
the official price was changed subsequent to the consummation of the
contract; it has entertained 143 a suit by a seller who mistakenly charged
less than the established price; 144 and it has considered a case where a
buyer mistakenly paid for a product for which there was no established
price.' 45 Thus, it was not that the arbitration boards lacked the
expertise, but that the political leaders-rightfully so, for a time-used
the wholesale price structure to manipulate the consumer and producer
economy by artifically raising and lowering prices. Now that this
element of interference has been largely eliminated, the arbitration
tribunals may operate to maintain legality in the economic sphere
of prices.
Arbiter: Comrade Premier, I still do not understand how all these
changes would affect the substantive law of contract which Arbitrazh
applies.
Kosygin: Take a case like Moscow Wholesale Warehouse v.
Dulevskiy Porcelain Plant,46 in which a distribution order was held
void, and the defense that the supplier fulfilled its plan was allowed to
defeat a claim for damages for an incomplete delivery of dishes.
If the supplying factory were operating under the new economic
management, the fact that it over-fulfilled its plan of production in
number of dishes would be meaningless. There is no longer any
independent significance to satisfying part of a production plan, such
as the number of dishes, without complying with contractual obligations
based on another aspect of the production plan (the value of the goods
produced) .14
143 In this situation, the price in effect at the time of shipment by the seller pre-
vails. Shippers are obliged to immediately inform the buyers about changes of prices
for the products. Letter of Instruction of April 28, 1967 (State Arbitration of the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers), [1967] 9 SoTs. ZAK. 89, 90; Johnson, supra note 141,
at 268.
144 State Arbitrazh allows a seller's claim in full. Departmental arbitration, on
the other hand, imposes a "joint liability," granting the seller one-half of the difference
between the established price and the invoiced price. Johnson, supra note 141, at
268-69.
145The buyer has the right to demand from the seller the return of the mistakenly
paid sum if the goods have not been used. Upon the unfounded refusal of this demand,
the buyer may bring suit in Arbitrash, which must consider the merits of the case.
Letter of Instruction of April 28, 1967 (State Arbitration of the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers), [1967] 9 SoTs. ZAK. 89, 90.
146 [1958] 9 Sbornik 54 (Collection), in Loeber, supra note 7, at 153-54. See text
accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
147 In fact, overfulfillment of an industrial target may mean greater losses to the
state because related organizations, still operating according to plan, must strain to
supply raw materials to the over-fulfilling plant, or to absorb its increased production.
See Bush, supra, note 91, at 35. The economic reform anticipates precise performance.
STATE ARBITRAZH
The defense that a supplier fulfilled its delivery plan should not
be sufficient to defeat a contract claim unless the defaulting enterprise
still operates on the output plan. This is so because the responsibility
of the enterprise which is in breach of a contractual obligation should
be judged according to the system in which its performance, in terms
of bonuses and penalties, ultimately will be evaluated.
Arbiter: I take it the result in the Moscow Woolen case 14--that
a producer is liable even if not supplied with sufficient raw materials-
is not so harsh if the producer was operating in a profitability system.
It is the producer's responsibility to see that it is supplied with adequate
raw materials or the funds to obtain them.
Kosygin: Yes, that is so. In conclusion, may I say that the trend
toward stabilization of the law applied by State Arbitrazh must be
implemented by the proposals put forth here in the spirit of the new
economic reform. Arbitrazh, as a specialized economic court, must be
concerned not only with the efficient operation of enterprises, 49 but
also with the vindication of property and contract rights.
148Moscow Woolen Base v. Troitsky Cloth Factory (State Arbitration of the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers 1965), [1966] 11 Soy. lusT. 31, discussed in text
accompanying notes 39-40 .supra.
149 Workers, engineers, and technicians! Improve the quality of output in every
way, persistently lower its cost l
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